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Abstract
Internal Corporate Venture Management is reportedly practiced by
at least 25% of the 500 largest industrial companies in the United.
States. In this paper, we report on a study of a sample of 18 commer-
cially successful and failing ventures.
We show that corporate venturing is successfully practiced in a
wide range of industries, over a wide range of scale of investment. We
note that our evidence suggests that corporate venturing is not exotic
and difficult to manage, but rather that it can be regarded as a robust
and simple variation of project management, and that it has potentially
wide applicability, By a comparison of the successful and the failing
internal corporate ventures in our sample, we identify several managerially-
controllable factors which significantly discriminate between success and
failure. Among these are: Prior experience by venture team members in
a venture marketplace is strongly correlated with venture success; Venture
Managers recruited from "low-level" positions in the parent corporation
are more likely to head successful ventures than are Venture Managers
recruited-from "medium" or "high" level positions.
Successful and Failing Internal Corporate Ventures:
An Empirical Study and Analysis
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Corporate venturing is an activity which seeks to generate new
businesses for the corporation in which it resides through the establish-
ment of internal corporate ventures. An internal corporate venture, in
turn, is an individual or group within the corporation which has taken
on responsibility for all aspects of the task of:
- developing a new product;
- bringing it to market;
- carrying it through at least its initial phases of marketplace
acti vity.
It is this characteristic of corporate venture - vesting of responsibility
for all aspects of the development and marketing of a new.product in one
executive, the venture manager - which distinguishes corporate venturing
from a range of other organizational strategems aimed at the same goal
of new product development.
"Internal Corporate Venturing" came into prominence in the late
1960's, but was not invented at that time. In fact, Robert M. Adams,
General Manager of 3M's New Business Ventures Division, (a practitioner
of the concept), suggests that the concept was probably practiced by
"our nomadic ancestors" and simply seems new today because "...from time
to time new terms or expressions for old situations rise to common usage
in our everyday vocabulary. Such terms become so popular and so prevalent,
so discussed and so disputed that we are led to presume that they describe
some amazing new social, scientific or economic phenomenon..." ] when
in fact nothing new is being described. Whatever - and whenever - the
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genesis of corporate venturing, considerable attention was given it in
the early 1970's by corporate innovators and innovation process
researchers.
Today the first bloom of enthusiasm greeting corporate venture
management is nearly gone, but the concept itself appears to have taken
at least temporary root in corporate practice. In 1969-1970, Fredrick
[5]
Cook surveyed the 100 largest U.S. industrial companies (1970 Fortune
listing) plus "several other large companies" and founc that forty of
these claimed to be then engaged in corporate venture management. In
[8]1972, Jones and Willemon ] reported on a 1970 questionnaire study of
the venture management practices of twenty-four companies classified
among the Fortune 500 largest industrial companies and extrapolated from
their data to estimate that 25% of all Fortune 500 companies had a ven-
ture management operation at that time. In 1973, Vespe: and Holmdahl
surveyed the "100 largest (in sales) firms on Fortune's 500 list which
had also won awards from Industrial Research since 1963 for introducing
"most significant new technical products, based on their importance,
uniqueness and usefulness in their respective fields." In this sample
of technically innovative firms, Vesper and Holmdahl found 65% claimed
to be using venture management, while another 9% planned to try the
approach.
In the remainder of this paper :we will:
- review the literature germane to corporate venturing (Section 2.0);
- present the rationale and methodology of our own empirical study
of corporate venturing (Section 3.0);
- present and discuss our findings (Section 4.0);
- summarize and note the implications of our rsul.t (s.ction 5.0).
III
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2.0 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Students of organizational behavior and research and development
management should find the concept of corporate venturing of some interest.
A central problem addressed by organizational theorists is the effective
integration of specialists around a multidisciplinary task. New product
development has long been recognized as a task requiring the input of
diverse specialties - notably R&D marketing and manufacturing. The
problem of integration is felt particularly keenly in new product develop-
ment because that function often operates under tight time constraints.
Accordingly, several researchers have examined specialization and integra-
tion in organizations in the new product development context.
Corporate venturing may be appropriately placed in the literature
bearing on achievement of integration and specialization in the context
of new product development, if we divide that literature into two seg-
ments. The first of these deals with means of integrating large, spe-
cialized organizational 'subunits through which new product development
projects flow. Recent exemplars of this segment of the literature are
a9] [21]
Lawrence and Lo-rch ] and Walton and Dutton. The second segment
includes corporate venturing and project management. This segment
focuses on organizational means of achieving the specialization and
integration needed in new product development tasks via the formation
of (usually) small ad hoc groups of specialists for each task who are
selected to have the needed specialist skills and who achieve the needed
integration via (usually) informal small group interaction. Salient
studies of project management in the R&D context are those conducted
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[i0] [11] [17]by Marquis et al.
The literature to date which deals directly with internal corporate
venturing only extends back to the mid-1960's. An early type of litera-
ture on the topic was provided by corporate practitioners of internal
corporate ventukring who described what they were doing in their respec-
tive firms and offered their anecdotal observations regarding successful
practice. Notable among articles in this category are those by Peterson[l3]
[21 [201
of DuPont, Adams of 3M, and Wallace 2 0 ] of Owens-Illinois. In broad
terms, practitioners suggested that autonomy from the day-to-day business
of the parent corporation; constant, visible, long-term top management
support for internal corporate ventures; and "entrepreneurial" venture
managers were essential for successful practice of internal corporate
venturing. 
Notable among research studies of new technological ventures are
those of Roberts[14] 1 whose main focus has been on technology-based
ventures which "spun-off" from major corporations and government labs.
·Roberts found te following factors to be present in the better performing
of such enterprises: (1) high degree of technology transfer from parent
firm to spin-off venture; (2) moderate educational level (e.g., Masters
of Science); (3) high attention to management, personnel and marketing
when measured relative to that provided by lower performing entrepreneurs.
[3.
One of Roberts' students - Buddenhagen [ 3] - specifically addressed
internal corporate venturing. He studied sixteen cases of internal
corporate venturing in one major firm. His goal, as ours, was to isolate
factors which discriminate significantly between internal venture success
and failure. The three factors which he found to be significantly
correlated with venture success were, in order of importance: (1) close
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relationship between the venture's product and a major product area of
the parent; (2) good cooperation between parent and venture as judged
by the venture manager; (3) "new" technology involved in the venture
product.
[5] [8] [18]Cook ], Jones and Willemon [8], and Vesper and Holmdahl have
reported on surveys which characterize current internal venture manage-
ment practice but which do not attempt to determine whether the charac-
teristics noted correlate with commercial success or failure of the
internal ventures generated. Characteristics reported on cover a wide
range - from educational background of the venture manager (Jones and
Willemon) to prent corporation's reason for introducing venture manage-
ment (Vesper and Holmdahl). During our discussion of findings, we will
refer to data from these surveys as relevant.
Finally, James Hlavacek[7] has reported on a survey of the causes
of failure in 21 internal corporate ventures - located in twelve Fortune
500 companies - as reported by both the top managements and the venture
managers involved with the failing ventures. He found market-related
problems to be the ones most frequently cited, including "market too
small", "did not fit distribution system", "distribution problems",
"inaccurate market research" and "resistance from existing sales force".
Top managements' next most frequently cited reasons for failure were
"sunk costs too h.gh", "technical problems" and "wrong venture manager".
Venture managers, on the other hand, reported "conflicts with divisional
managers" and "impatient top management" to be the second only to market-
related problems as causes of failure.
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3.0 METHODOLOGY
From our review of the literature, preceding, we see that there
exist today some few hypotheses by researchers and practitioners as to
"what must be done to achieve success at corporate venturing", which
have not been empirically tested, plus some survey data on what is being
done in corporate venture practice. The available survey data cannot
be used to test extant hypotheses regarding successful venture practice.
because it is not stratified according to venture success or failure.
1
It has been our goal in the study reported on here, therefore, to
generate appropriate data and to provide an empirical test for some of
the hypotheses current in the literature plus some of our own regarding
factors which discriminate between success and failure at internal cor-
porate venturing.
In essence, our study design involves selection of two samples of
internal corporate ventures - one sample consisting of commercial
2
successes and ne sample of commercial failures. Measures hypothesized
to discriminate strongly between venture success and failure are tested
1.
The research reported on here was conducted as part of the author's
doctoral dissertation.[19]
Our criterion of commercial success was chosen to conform as closely as
possible to the criteria actually used by the companies in our study.
Although the initial projection made when deciding to invest in a venture
was often rosier, we found that parent corporations would in general
categorize ventures achieving 10% profit before tax (initial research,
development and "shakedown" expenses being excluded for purposes of this
calculation) and "rapid" sales growth as commercial successes. "Rapid"
sales growth was not quantified by the companies studied, and we found
annual percentage growth rates in many of the successful ventures studied
highly discontinuous. On a smoothed basis, however, all ventures in our
sample categorized as commercially successful were achieving a minimum
of 150% annual aowth in sales.
A venture was judged a commercial failure if it did not meet one
of the two above criteria at three or more years after venture start up
and if, on examination of detailed sales and financial data, it
showed no trend suggesting it might meet the criteria within two years.
ill
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against these wo samples to see whether the hypothesized effect can
indeed be observed.
Our sample of internal corporate ventures was generated by attempting
to contact those responsible for venturing via the headquarters of the 33
firms in the Fortune listing of the 100 largest U.S. industrial companies
which. Cook had identified [5 as engaged in internal corporate venturing
as of 1970. Twenty of our contact attempts brought forth preliminary
information which allowed us to determine that eight of the twenty would
not be appropriate for inclusion in our study for the following reasons:
- ventu-ce activity discontinued (three cases);
-."venture group" not engaged in ventures as this .study defines
them (three cases);
- ventures too young (less than three years since start-up) to
be evaluated (two cases).
After this initial screening, we made energetic attempts to recruit the
remaining twelve companies to our study. The benefit offered to firms
which joined was access to detailed but aggregated and disguised data
at. the conclusion of the study. The conditions we felt it necessary to
impose on firms joining the study were that we be allowed access to
some elements of venture financial data and direct contact with venture
personnel - rather than proxy contact via the corporate vice presidents
in overall charge cf the venture activity. In the end, only six firms
were willing to join the study under these conditions. Later, a seventh
firm was added (Firm E in Table 1) to the study which did not appear on
Cook's list. In this instance, the corporate venture manager heard of
our work via a third party and contacted us to suggest that his corpora-
tion be included.
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The process described yielded a sample of 21 ventures. Three of
these ventures were then eliminated by application of a final criterion -
"Can it be demonstrated that the product/market concept upon which the
venture was based had the potential for commercial success?" The result-
ing final study sample of 18 ventures is characterized in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Structure of Study Sample
Number of:
Parent of Internal Corporate Venture: Independent
Corporate Failing Successful
Code Major Business Venture Sponsors Ventures Ventures
A Package and Packaging Material Mfr. 1 0 2
B Consumer "ConVenience" Food Mfr. 1 0 2
C Industrial Chemiicals and Plastics Mfr. 1 1 2
D Glass and Glass Products Mfr. 1 2 0
E Publishing and Direct Mail Advertising 3 1 2
F Vegetable Protein Products Mfr. 1 0 1
G Industrial Goods Conglomerate 4 3 2
12 7 11
18
With the exception of Company C, all companies participating in our
study gave us access to all their extant ventures which we found met our
study criteria. (Company C felt it had to restrict our access to some
.3
We apply this final selection criterion because the goal of our study
is to learn what financial, organizational, etc. variables are correlated
with corporate venture success. Inclusion in our sample of ventures
which failed in spite of "doing everything right" because the product/
market concept simply had no potential for success would have the effect
of weakening these correlations. The test we used for assuring that
each venture in our sample was working with a concept which was at least
potentially successful was: If we could not find one or more examples
of a successful commercial activity employing the same (a very close fit
was required) market/product concept as that of a failing venture avail-
able for study, that venture is excluded from the sample. (Note that it
was not felt necessary to apply this test to successful ventures in the
sample. The fact of their success was felt to be ample demonstration
that the concept which they were working with was a potential success.)
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ventures whose existence was not common knowledge and which were "key
to the company's future".) As can be seen from Table 1, certain ventures
will not be independent on certain measures (e.g., two ventures often
have the same sponsor). Possible interdependencies will be addressed
as they become germane in our data analysis.
Data collection was conducted by means of face-to-face interviews
using a structured interview guide with the venture sponsor and with
the manager and key staff of ventures selected for study. Financial
data was derived from venture financial records.
4.0 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
As the reader may have noted from the introduction to this paper,
an internal corporate venture is defined only in terms of its role:
"Responsibility for all aspects of the task of developing a new product;
bringing it to market; carrying it through at least its initial phases
of marketplace activity." This definition allows room for many different
implementations of an internal corporate venture in terms of structure,
scale, etc., and we did find great variability along these and other
dimensions in our sample. Two features were invariably present in our
sample, however. There was always a "Venture Manager" - the CEO of the
venture, as it were, and there was always what we termed a "Venture
Sponsor", the executive to whom the Venture Manager reported. The
Venture Sponsor funded the venture from his budget and provided the
formal hierarchical.linkage between the venture and the parent corpora-
tion.
In the sections which follow, we will present our findings on:
The diversity of corporate ventures encountered vs. success (Section 4.1);
the relationship etween venture success and prior experience in the
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business area addressed (Section 4.2); characteristics of the Venture
Sponsor (Section 4.3) and the Venture Manager (Section 4.4) vs. venture
success.
4.1 Diversity- in Internal
Corporate Ventures
There is no initially apparent reason why Internal Corporate Ven-
turing should be successful only within a certain market, product or
technology area, or within a certain size range. The literature does
not suggest that any field of business activity is inappropriate for
such ventures. As may be seen from Table 2, our sample shows the con-
cept is in fact currently being applied "across the board": To materials
(Ventures # 1, 2, 3, 5 and 16), components (Ventures 4, 6, 17), and to
finished industrial goods (Ventures 1, 2, 7, 12, 13, 14) and services
(Venture 18), as well as to consumer goods (Ventures 8, 9, 15) and
services (Ventures 10, 11). Examples of both success and failure can
be seen in each of the enumerated categories, except industrial and con-
sumer services. Given the size of our sample, the strongest statement
-we can make is t'hat venture management is being practiced currently in
all of these areas and can at least potentially succeed (and fail) in
all.
Table 2 documents the wide range in the scale upon which ventures
in our sample were conducted, as measured both by dollars invested and
by numbers of full-time employees. Given the diversity in venture busi-
nesses represented, one would expect some diversity in these measures
even if all ventures were carried out on the minimum practicable scale.
(Clearly, it takes more investment to get a product manufacturing venture
going than it does a "products-by-mail-order" service.) Diversity on
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Table 2
Characterization of
SUCCESSFUL VENTURE
NO. BUSINESS
Total Investment
TO FIRST SALE
$(000) Years
TO BREAKEVEN
$(000) Years
Total Full-Time Employees
1 YEAR AFTER AT TIME OF
START-UP FIRST SALE
1 Shrink Film Packagirg Systems
2 Produce Wrap Packaging Systems
3 New Plastic Resin & Molded Items
4 Solid State Devices
5 Protein from Dairy Waste
6 Electronic Digital Displays
7 Numerical Machine ToDi Controls
8 Disposable Plastic ishes
9 Home Sewing Kits
10 Products by Mail Order
11 Magazine Sales by 'Stamps'
100 2
550 4
145
650
4
5
8,000 4 30,250 8
9,000 4 21,250 8
1,500 1 1,500 1
1,500 2 2,300 3
NA NA 5,200 8
500 2
400 2
5 1
5 1
NA 3 (est.) 3
1,540 2 2
55 1.5
110 4.5
Characterization of
FAILING VENTURE
BUSINESS
Total Investment
TO FIRST SALE
$(000) Years
TO DATE
$(000) Years
Total Full-Time Employees
1 YEAR AFTER
START-UP
AT TIME OF
FIRST SALE
12 New Plastic Floor Til.e
13 Computer Traffic Light Controls
14 Computer Medical Diagnostic
Systems
15 Snowmobiles, Trail Bikes
16 Ceramic Products
17 Large Digital Displays
18 Shoppers Directory for
Industrial Goods
2,400 1 7,500 4*
50 1 1,000 5
2,600 4 2,600 4
480 2 4,500- 4*
2,000* 3 32,080 8
2,100 4 10,596 8
150 1 1,150 3*
*Terminated as of April 1973.
1
1
1
1
80
20
137
170
102
4
36
NO.
50
NA
3
2
1
1
1
1
50 50
5 10
5 22
5 50
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
.
.
-
- -
-- - - - - --------
"'~~~~~~~ 
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the employee count measure was further increased by the practice of
some ventures - notably those with one employee - to contract out
functions such as product development which were performed internally
by ventures with higher employee counts.
[2] [131 [6]
Some internal venture practitioners [2]13] and consultants sug-
gest that a small scale is most appropriate to successful venturing,
without quantifying "small", on the grounds that necessary integration
of specialties and fast reaction time is thus ensured. In our sample,
however, we find no "scale effect" large enough to show up as a signifi-
cant correlation (as assessed by the Mann-Whitney U est) between
venture·success and dollar investment to first product sale, nor between
venture success and full-time employee count at the end of the first
-year or at the time of first product.sale.
4.2 Prior Relationship to Market
Although corporate venture management appears potentially successful
over a wide range of product areas and scales of effort, we find a strong
relationship between venture success and the prior experience of the
parent corporation and/or the venture team personnel with the customers
addressed by a given venture.
From Column 1 of Table 3, we.find that ventures addressed to classes
of customers the parent corporation has previously dealt with have a
high probability of success - while those addressed to new. customers
invariably fail. (Fisher's exact p = .01).
From Column 2, we see that, if a parent corporation had experience
with a particular class of customers, someone from the parent with that
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Table 3. Factors Involving Prior Relationship to Market
I
X
X
1X
I
:RIPTION
SUCCESS (n - l1)
Shrink Film Pk9 Systems
Produce Wrap Pkg Systems
Plastic Resin and olded Items
Solid State Devices
Protein from Dairy Waste
Electronic Digital Displays
Numerical Machine Tool Controls
Disposable Plastic Dishes
Home Swing Kits
Products by Mail Order
Magazine Sales by 'Stamps'
FAILURE (in 7)
New Plastic Floor Tile
Computer Traffic Light Controls
Computer edical Diagnostic Systems
Snowmobiles Trail Bikes
Ceramic Products, Zero Thermal Expansion
Large Digital Displays
Shoppers Directory, ndustrial Goods
experience was invariably included on the venture team - and thus the
correlation between the presence of a venture team member with such
experience and venture success was also p = .01.
4The experience referred to in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 is defined as
marketing/sales experience with precisely the customers whom the venture
is trying to adcoress. In order for a digital display venture to qualify
for a "Yes" answer to this question, it would not be sufficient that
they have on board a man with experience selling electronic components
such as resistors. They must have on board a man who has sold to the
very same people who are now interested in digital displays. Thus, in
the particular instance of this example, the current market (as of 1972)
for solid state digital displays lies overwhelmingly with the manufac-
turers of electronic calculators. Therefore, to qualify for a "Yes" to
the market experience question, a venture manufacturing solid-state
displays would have to have a man on board who had previously sold to
precisely these electronic calculator manufacturers (but had not neces-
sarily sold displays to them).
I
X
I
I
I
I
I
I
X
X
X .
.
X
I
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In two instances (Column 3) in which venture teams did not include
members recruited from the parent corporation with experience in the
proposed venture marketplace, members with such experience were recruited
from outside the parent. In both of these instances, the resulting
venture was a commercial success. If the data from Columns 2 and 3 are
combined, we find that the presence of a person on the venture team
(either from the parent or outside) correlates very strongly with venture
success (Fisher's exact p = .001). From Column 4, we see that a venture
product/market concept initiated on the basis of perception of a market
need rather than on the basis of a technological capability (as in:
"What can we sell which will use our 'X' material?") was more likely to
be commercially successful (Fisher's exact p = .057).
The data of Table 3 may also be displayed in what is called a
"gatekeeping" method by Dave Montgomery. [12] In this method, a series
of questions are asked of a (in this instance) corporate venture, with
the goal of finding answers which clearly and completely discriminate
successes and failures by means of the fewest possible questions. This
method improves upon the 2 X 2.test of significance in that it clearly
indicates any sample subset which may not be included in the statistically
significant majority of any of the answers to the questions asked in
format one.
-The gatekeeping chart below discriminates between successes and
failures with near total accuracy by asking only three questions - a
good performance.
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181 ...Total in sample
ilil...Successes In sample
Sell to established parent customers?
- an¢ - Yes No
Use market expe.r ;mced parent personnel?
7[] [4'
Obtain market experienced personnel from outside?
Venture Initiating element - mar
or technological capability?
Our finding regarding the strong ability of the above market-related
variables to discriminate between commercially successful and failing
internal corporate ventures fits very well with the findings of other
studies which have examined new product success vs. failure in a range
of contexts. As the reader will recall from our review of the literature,
preceding, the strongest success-related factor which Buddenhagen's
study of internal corporate ventures found was "close relationship
between the venture's product and a major product area of the parent".
Roberts, in his study 14 of ventures spun off from major corporations
and government labs, found one of the factors which discriminated between
higher and lower performance was attention to marketing, as indicated
by the explicit presence of a marketing department. In addition, Project
[1Sappho] [16]Sappho , a study of success-failure pairs of new products developed
1_11__11111_1___·__-------
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within conventional corporate R&D contexts, found that "accurate under-
standing of user needs" - however acquired - was the strongest of their
many measures in its ability to discriminate commercially successful
projects from failures. Finally, recall that Hiavacek, in his survey
of the major causes of internal corporate venture failure[ ] , found
market-related factors topping the list.
One of the virtues of the internal corporate venture is often sug-
gested to be its utility as a mechanism for getting a major corporation
into business areas new to it. Do our findings regarding the correlation
of internal venture success with a parent corporation's prior relation-
ship with a given et of customers indicate that corporate venturing is
in fact unsuited to that role? For two reasons, we would not argue so:
(1) Although we found that successful ventures sold to extant
parent company customers, they sold new products via new, venture-
controlled distribution channels to these customers. In some instances,
these new products were clearly distinct enough from present products of
the parent to constitute a "new business area" for the parent (e.g., the
first products in the electronic component area for a plastics manufac-
turer).
(2) Our data cannot distinguish between venture success being
caused by the parent firm having a prior relationship with the venture
customer and/or the venture personnel having such a relationship. If
further research shows the key variable to be personnel experience (and
data in the third column of Table 3 suggests that this might be the
case), then parent firms may start internal corporate ventures addressed
to any customers, so long as they have a person on the venture team -
recruited from either inside or outside the parent - who has had prior
experience in marketing to precisely those customers.
Ill
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4.3 The Venture Sponsor
The venture sponsor role involves generating ideas for new ventures
and/or screening ideas provided by others; forming venture teams and/or
screening suggested teams for suitability; and then, eventually, funding
the idea-team ackage(s) which one thinks will be successful. The venture
sponsor role is very much the corporate equivalent of the role which
"venture capitalists" play relative to non-corporate ventures. As is the
case with venture capitalists, expectations regarding the help and
monitoring a venture receives from its sponsor beyond funding are not
firm, and practice is quite variable in our sample.
Those vested with the responsibility of venture sponsorship within
our sample did not necessarily regard it as a boon - "I wonder what
they're trying to tell me," muttered an executive vice-president so
honored. The eason for this attitude is clear. Compared with a normal
line responsibility of equivalent level, the venture sponsorship respon-
sibility involves more risk (it is generally accepted wisdom that most
ventures in a portfolio will fail) and less resources (pumping a few
million dollars per year into a few ventures is not considered high
finance in the context of a multi-billion dollar corporation). -Also,
the job has an unpleasant dynamic: Successful ventures are often sup-
posed to be "spun off" into independent divisions; absorbed by existing
divisions, etc. - a process which leaves even the successful venture
sponsor with a portfolio of marginal and failing ventures. A man in
this position may be forgiven for feeling a bit vulnerable.
Sponsors of corporate ventures who are not formally charged with
that responsibility, but "just do it on the side" with budgetary slack,
avoid much of the exposure and risk accruing to those who are formally
_I__ _j· 1ll ·r___s____l___lP______ _____ _
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charged with the task. Our sample of 12 venture sponsors includes
seven not formally charged with the function and five who were: the
difference in vnture success between the two populations was not statis-
tically significant - nor was the difference in total dollars at risk
to venture first sale in a venture sponsor's venture portfolio.
Practitioners of venture sponsorship - especially those formally
charged with the task - assert strongly (cf. Wallace, Peterson) that
close contact with the parent CEO is necessary (presumably to weather
the storms involved in venture failures' long time to breakeven, etc.).
We found no significant correlation between distance of venture sponsor
from parent company CEO (measured by number of hierarchical levels which
separated the two) and venture success.
4.4 The Venture Manager
(14] 2] [20
Researchers (Poberts ), practitioners (Adams ] Wallace[20]) ,
(6]
and consultants Hanan ) all agree that the characteristics of the
manager of an internal corporate venture are key to the success of that
venture. Data on what the characteristics of such a'manager should be,
however, are sparse. Some studies exist which characterize the entre-
preneur founders of successful new independent businesses, but it is
not clear that these characterizations are generalizable to the success-
ful manager of internal corporate ventures. Our concerns on this score
are increased by the observation that the characteristics of a successful
founder of a new independent business apparently are a strong function
of the type of business engaged in. Roberts found that the type of
individual who started a technology-based company had an average age of
31-32 years and lad attained a Master's degree level of education -
generally in an engineering field. Further, Roberts found that these
ill
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individuals hai been successful in the jobs they had held prior to
[4]
starting their own companies. Collins and Moore , on the other hand,
studied a sample of "light manufacturers of hard goods" located in
Michigan, and observed the founders of these to be in their forties, to
have a high-school degree or less, and to be notable for a history of
failure at previous employment.
The only published data available prior to our present study on
what the characteristics of managers of internal corporate ventures
actually are in present practice comes from the Jones and Willemon[ 8]
and Buddenhagen[3] studies cited previously. In two categories - age
and education - the data we collected regarding venture managers was
also collected by those studies. Jones and Willemon found that in the
twenty-four industrial and consumer good companies they surveyed, venture
managers "tend to be in their early forties, although the ages ranged
from the late twenties to the early sixties." Highest education level
achieved by the venture managers in their survey was Bachelors 48%,
MBA 32%, and Ph.D. iO%. (Four percent had "no higher education".)
Buddenhagen found the "entrepreneurs" (venture managers) in his study
to have a median age of 36 and education to the Master's level.
The findings of both studies were reasonably congruent with our
own on age and education levels of corporate venture managers. We found
a median age of 41 years, with a range of 35-50 years (n = 11) and found
the highest educational level achieved to be the Bachelors degree in all
but one case - the one exception having achieved an MBA (n = 11). We do
not know whether these characteristics of venture managers differ from
the characteristics of other classes of managers at the parent company.
We do know that age level shows no differential correlation between
venture success and failure.
_ __lsl___P__1)_ID____)____-·I_ ·
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We measured a few other variables bearing on the venture manager
which serve the useful purpose of further characterizing the current
population of corporate venture managers but which proved to not discrim-
inate significantly between managers of successful and managers of failing
corporate ventures. All venture managers in our sample were selected
from inside the parent company. The median level of pre-venture service
with the parent company was substantial, 17 years, with a range from 8
to 27 years. Venture manager age and length of service with the parent
company were highly correlated, to the net effect that all venture mana-
gers in our sample had been "company men" since their twenties. Prac-
titioners of venture management (e.g., Peterson, Adams) suggest that a
very high level of dedication to the venture on the part of the venture
manager is important to success. We found no extraordinary dedication
to the ventures in our sample at least in terms of the following measure:
All of our venture managers perceived their future in terms of movement
up the career ladder of the parent company as a whole, rather than in
terms of growing with the venture. Commitment to the venture was seen
as temporary - a career development step of limited duration. As another
possible measure of extraordinary dedication to doing the venture manage-
ment task well, we asked venture managers if they felt a protege relation-
ship to their immediate superior, the venture sponsor (Measure: an
affirmative answer to, "Would you leave the parent company to follow the
venture sponsor?"). Only two venture managers - one managing a success-
ful venture and one a failing venture - felt such a strong relationship.
The venture manager-related variable which we found did discriminate
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significantly between venture success and failure was "level" of venture
manager in the company prior to assumption of the venture manager role.
We found that venture managers who had previously held medium and high
level jobs in the parent company were significantly less likely (Fisher's
exact p = .02) to be associated with successful ventures than were venture
managers who had previously held low level jobs in the parent companies.
Interestingly, venture managers who had previously held medium and
high positions in the parent company seemed to regard their venture mana-
gerships as demotions, in effect. This issue was obviously a sensitive
one for these interviewees, and they often weren't really sure they had
been demoted - after all, the opportunity had been painted as full of
potential, albeit along with a bit of risk. In objective terms, their
present positions did involve a reduction in resources and employees
relative to their-previous positions.
A previous study of research and development project management by
[17]
Rubin generated a finding similar to ours, viz: management of a
project by a manager whose previous project responsibility had been
larger in terms of resources allocated was significantly correlated with
project failure (p '.02).. Neither that study nor ours, however, has the
data to objectively determine whether the demotion (in terms of resources
controlled) caused failure by, perhaps, lowering the self-esteem of a
previously successful manager, or whether the demotion involved a nega-
tive judgment by the parent about the competence of the manager - in
which case the hi.gh failure rate might be competence related. Whatever
5
"Previous level in company" was coded as "high", "medium", or "low":
Venture managers who had "high" previous positions had been divisional
managers or "line" vice presidents; those in "medium" levels had been
responsible for multimillion dollar programs or activities within a
division; and those who had "low" previous positions had been responsible
for at most ten persons.
___11____1_^___1_I_-
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the reason, it would appear to be wise to avoid assigning managers to
venture management tasks if they have previously managed an amount of
resources greater than that involved in the venture.
5.0 SUMMARY
Practitioners and consultants have sometimes addressed internal
corporate venturing as if it were an exotic - requiring very precise
conditions if it is to fluorish within a major corporation. This point
of view apparently derives from the assumption that one is trying to
replicate an independent, small business start-up within the major cor-
poration; that the key to doing this successfully is the "entrepreneur"
(venture manager); and that potential entrepreneurs are rare and seldom
found (or retained) within the confines of a major corporation. No
documentation is adduced for this last point - indeed, none exists - but
acceptance of the assumption can make life very difficult for a Venture
Sponsor trying to practice internal corporate venturing "properly".
Witness an anecdote from Cook: "...The head of this [study] participant's
venture function realized that of his over 20,000 employees, only about
100 could even be considered for the venture manager position. He finally
narrowed this number down to two and found both of these candidates lacked
qualifications. ' ()6
Taken in aggregate, our findings disprove the above notion. We have
found corporate venture management to be a robust concept which can be
successfully practiced (1) in a wide range of industries, (2) on a wide
range of scales, (3) by venture sponsors who may or may not be specifi-
cally charged with the responsibility and who may or may not be "close
to top management", and (4) by venture managers who are not screened for
6See Cook 5] page 31.
III
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special "entrepreneurial" characteristics but are simply "rotated through"
management of a venture as part of their career with the parent corpora-
tion.
The robustness we have observed makes sense, we suggest, if one
views a corporate venture not as an independent venture taken indoors
but rather as an important variation on the tried and true organizational
practice of project management. The key variation on ordinary project
management practice demanded by the concept of corporate venturing is
the vesting of responsibility for the complete new product development
process, from concept through initial marketplace activity, in one
venture manager. The potential utility of substituting this concept
for other organizational means of performing new product development -
at least under some circumstances - is supported both by the literature
and by anecdotal data:
* As we noted earlier, the literature supports the importance
of integration of various phases of the new product develop-
ment task and emphasizes the importance of accurate under-
standing of user need to achievement of marketplace success.
The internal venture concept would seem to offer a good format
for the achievement of both of these elements: integration
is achieved by small group interaction and accurate under-
standing of user is achieved by the experience of venture
team mmbers, probably enhanced by the direct interface of
the venture to the marketplace.
* Anecdotally, we were often told by venture sponsors and
managers that a given product - developed successfully in the
context of corporate venturing - could not have been developed
within the confines of the corporation's ordinary product
development organization. Reasons adduced for this were
various. As an example, we were told in one company that the
compensation scheme for the regular sales force was such that
_I  --UI^IY-III .---- -
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it was more profitable for salesmen to get re-orders for
standard products from established customers than it was to
get trial orders for new products. New products offered
throu;gh this sales force thus had a dismal track record.
Given political realities at this company, it was considered
more expedient to leave the present sales compensation struc-
ture intact, and to develop new products in a venture format.
Successful products were then transferred to the regular
sales force when repeat orders had reached a level which was
appropriate to that compensation structure.
Internal Corporate Venturing is now apparently in widespread use.
Rules for its successful management can be developed via the type of
comparison of successful and failing practice which we conducted in the
present study. Our small sample demonstrated several factors signifi-
cantly correlated with successful corporate venture practice - notably
the need for venture team members to have prior experience in a proposed
venture marketplace and the negative correlation between previous cor-
porate level of a venture manager and venture success. Similar studies
based on larger samples would doubtless identify more such factors,
and we suggest that it would be of value to both corporate venture
practitioners and to researchers if such studies were carried out.
ill
-25-
References
1. B. Achilladelis, et al., "Project Sappho: A Study of Success and
Failure in Innovation", Science Policy Research Unit, University
of Sussex, August 1971 (two volumes).
2. Robert M. Adams, "An Approach to New Business Ventures", Research
Management, No. 4, 1969, p. 225.
3. Frederick L. Buddenhagen, Internal Entrepreneurship as a Corporate
Strategy for New Product Development, unpublished S.M. theses,
M.I.T., August 1967.
4. Orvis Collins and David Moore, The Enterprising Man, Michigan State
University Business Studies, 1964.
5. Fredrick Cook, Venture Management, Towers, Perrin, Forster and
Crosby, Inc., New York, August 1970. (Towers, Perrin, Forster and
Crosby, Inc. is a management consulting firm in which Fredrick
Cook is a partner. The firm restricts circulation of the full
report.)
6. Mark Hanan, "Corporate Growth Through Venture Management", Harvard
Business Review, February 1969.
i 7. James D. Havacek, "Toward More Successful Venture Management",
Journal of Marketing, October 1974.
8. Kenneth A. Jones and David L. Willemon, "Emerging Patterns in New
I Venture Manaqement", Research Management, November 1972, p. 15.
9. Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch, Organization and Environment, Richard
D. Irwin, Ir.c., Homewood, Ill., 1969.
10. D.G. Marquis and Irwin M. Rubin, Management Factors in Project
Performance, unpublished paper, 1966.
11. D.G. Marquis and D.M. Straight, "Organizational Factors in Project
Performance", Sloan School of Management Working Paper #135-65,
1965. Also in Research Program Effectiveness, edited by Y. Yovitz
et al., Gordcn and Breach, 1965.
12. David Montgor.lery, "New Product Distribution: An Analysis of Super-
market Buying Decisions", Research Paper #104, Stanford Graduate
School of Business, Stanford University, August 1972.
13. Russell W. Peterson, "New Venture Management in a Large Company",
Harvard Business Review, May-June 1967.
14. Edward B. Roberts, "Entrepreneurship and Technology", Research
Management, July 1968.
15. Edward B. Roberts and Alan Frohman, "Internal Entrepreneurship:
Strategy for Growth", Business Quarterly, Spring 1972.
- ---- --
-26-
16. Roy Rothwell, Chris Freeman, et al., "Sappho Updated - Project
Sappho Pase 2", Research Policy 3, 1974.
17. Irwin M. Rubin, "Project Management and the Role of the Project
Manager", Sloan School of Management Working Paper #222-66, 1966.
18. Karl H. Vesper and Thomas G. Holmdah., "How Venture Management
Fares in nnovative Companies", Research Management, May 1973,
p. 30.
19. Eric A. von Hippel, An Exploratory Study of Corporate Venturing - A
New Product Innovation Strategy Used by Some Major Corporations,.
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Carnegie-Mellon University, May
1973.
20. Robert T. Wallace, "New Venture Management at Owens-Illinois",
Research Management, No. 4, 1969.
21. Richard Walton and John Dutton, "The Management of Interdepartmental
Conflict: A Model and Review", Administrative Science Quarterly,
Vol. 14, No. 1, March 1969.
